

## **Supplementary Materials Appendix: Subconstituency-based Analyses for the Paper “Are Voter Decision Rules Endogenous to Parties’ Policy Strategies?”**

The following pages report parameter estimates on structural equation models that we estimated on subsets of British Election Study (BES) panel respondents who were subdivided by their reported levels of education (see Table S1 below), their reported incomes (Table S2), their reports about whether they read a daily newspaper (Table S3), and their scores on a political knowledge quiz (Table S4). For each subset of respondents, the table presents the parameters that we estimated based on the structural equation model given by equations 1-3 in the paper (the definitions of the variables in these equations are also given in the text of the paper). We note that we briefly summarize these analyses in the section of our paper entitled “Are there Individual Differences?” but we do not present the actual parameter estimates in the paper due to space constraints. The analyses we report in Tables S1-S4 below parallel those we report in Table 4 in the paper, which presents parameter estimates on BES panel respondents subdivided according to their scores on a political engagement index.

For the education, income, and knowledge-based analyses presented below the panel respondents were subdivided into two groups: those who were at or above the median level on the focal variable, versus those below the median. Because a large proportion of British Election Study (BES) respondents were at the median reported level of education, the N for the high-education group in Table S1 below is significantly larger than the N for the low-education group (this same pattern obtains, albeit to a lesser extent, for the income and knowledge-based analyses presented in Tables S2 and S4 below).

For the education, income, and newspaper-based analyses we report parameter estimates on three different BES panels, those for 1987-1992, 1992-1997, and 1997-2001. Because the 1987-1992 BES panel did not include the political knowledge quiz, the political knowledge-based parameter estimates presented in Table S4 are reported for the 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 panels only.

As we discuss in our paper, the parameter estimates reported in Tables S1-S4 below provide no evidence that educated, affluent, newspaper-reading, or politically-knowledgeable citizens displayed different reciprocal patterns of policy- and partisan-based updating in comparison to less educated, affluent, and knowledgeable citizens (along with those who did not read newspapers): for each subgroup of BES panel respondents our parameter estimates on the cross-lagged effects of left-right preferences and party attachments continue to support the policy primacy hypothesis and the elite depolarization hypothesis (these hypotheses are described in the paper), and, furthermore, the magnitudes of these parameter estimates are similar across different subgroups, a pattern that supports the subconstituencies hypothesis which states that British citizens’ tendencies to reciprocally update their policy beliefs and their party evaluations are similar across different subgroups in the electorate.

Specifically, we find that the differences between the estimates of the stability and the cross-lagged coefficients across the different subgroups are not statistically significant.<sup>1</sup> In addition, we note that our cross-lagged coefficient estimates are strikingly similar when comparing groups of more versus less educated respondents (Table S1), newspaper readers versus non-readers (Table S3), and respondents with higher and

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<sup>1</sup> For each subgroup-based analysis (i.e., analyses of more- versus less-educated respondents, of high- versus low-income respondents, etc.) we estimated two models to determine whether the differences between the coefficient estimates on the latent constructs of the two groups were statistically significant, one where the coefficient estimates  $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$  in equations 1-3 in the paper were constrained to be equal across the two subgroups, and a second where these coefficient estimates were allowed to vary between the subgroups. In all cases, the differences between the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistics for the unconstrained and constrained estimations were not statistically significant (with degrees of freedom equal to the number of constraints imposed).

lower levels of political knowledge (Table S4). The single case where the cross-lagged coefficient estimates differ noticeably between subgroups is for the income-based analyses, where the estimates imply that lower-income respondents display (modestly) stronger tendencies to update their party attachments to match their left-right orientations, compared to high-income respondents. However this difference is not statistically significant and moreover there is no theoretical rationale for this pattern. In toto, we believe the estimates reported in Tables S1-S4 thereby support the subconstituencies hypothesis.

**Table S1: Subconstituency Analyses - Education**

|   | 1987-1992         |       | 1992-1997         |       | 1997-2001         |       |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
|   | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient (S.E) |       |
| <b><u>High Education</u></b>                      |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .76**             | (.05) | .89**             | (.05) | .86**             | (.03) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .69**             | (.06) | .56**             | (.04) | .86**             | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | 1.06**            | (.15) | 1.97**            | (.14) | .71**             | (.07) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.66**            | (.11) | -.52**            | (.11) | -.07              | (.08) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | -.01              | .03)  | -.01              | (.04) | -.07**            | (.02) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .67**             | (.17) | .56**             | (.12) | .17*              | (.08) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | -.03              | (.04) | -.07              | (.04) | -.02              | (.03) |
| <i>N</i>  | 1054              |       | 1095              |       | 1689              |       |
| <b><u>Low Education</u></b>                       |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .71**             | (.07) | .79**             | (.05) | .83**             | (.05) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .75**             | (.08) | .50**             | (.06) | .90**             | (.05) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | 1.07**            | (.27) | .76**             | (.17) | .30**             | (.09) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.80**            | (.26) | -.67**            | (.17) | -.09              | (.14) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | .04               | (.04) | -.07              | (.04) | -.07*             | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .61*              | (.25) | .75***            | (.19) | .09               | (.12) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | .03               | (.06) | -.09              | (.07) | .06               | (.05) |
| <i>N</i>  | 539               |       | 824               |       | 748               |       |
| <b>Model Fit</b>                                  |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| $\chi^2$ (df = 172)                               | 528.6             |       | 454.1             |       | 533.7             |       |
| $\Delta_1/\Delta_2$                               | .96/.97           |       | .97/.98           |       | .97/.98           |       |
| $\rho_1/\rho_2$                                   | .94/.96           |       | .95/.97           |       | .95/.97           |       |

\*  $p < 0.05$  ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

**Notes:** For the education-based analyses we subdivided the BES respondents according to whether they were at or above the median in the level of schooling they had completed (high education respondents), versus those who were below the median (low-education respondents). (Note that the N's for the high-education respondents significantly exceed those for low-education respondents, because large proportions of respondents in each panel were at the median reported education level.) The coefficients reported in the table were estimated for the specifications given by equations 1-3 in the paper. See the paper for the descriptions and codings of the variables. Sources: 1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 British Election Study panels. Entries are unstandardized, maximum-likelihood estimates (the standard errors for these estimates are reported in parentheses). Factor variances, error variances, error covariances, and disturbances omitted for clarity.

**Table S2: Subconstituency Analyses - Income**

|   | 1987-1992         |       | 1992-1997         |       | 1997-2001         |       |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
|   | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient (S.E) |       |
| <b><u>High Income</u></b>                         |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .79**             | (.05) | .91**             | (.05) | .85**             | (.04) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .73**             | (.07) | .59**             | (.04) | .91**             | (.04) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | .85**             | (.13) | .83**             | (.12) | .70**             | (.07) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.53**            | (.10) | -.50**            | (.10) | -.07              | (.08) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | .00               | (.04) | -.02              | (.05) | -.08*             | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .45**             | (.16) | .49**             | (.10) | .11               | (.08) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | .03               | (.04) | -.01              | (.04) | -.02              | (.04) |
| <i>N</i>  | 796               |       | 901               |       | 1112              |       |
| <b><u>Low Income</u></b>                          |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .72**             | (.07) | .77**             | (.05) | .86**             | (.04) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .80**             | (.09) | .44**             | (.11) | .91**             | (.05) |
| Left-right preferences → left-right preferences   | 1.14**            | (.28) | 1.07**            | (.29) | .50**             | (.12) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.92**            | (.26) | -.72**            | (.16) | -.08              | (.15) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | .02               | (.04) | -.06              | (.04) | -.06*             | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .57*              | (.25) | .84**             | (.21) | -.02              | (.12) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | .03               | (.06) | -.21              | (.11) | .03               | (.05) |
| <i>N</i>  | 657               |       | 856               |       | 1053              |       |
| <b>Model Fit</b>                                  |                   |       |                   |       |                   |       |
| $\chi^2$ (df = 172)                               | 480.7             |       | 448.8             |       | 510.1             |       |
| $\Delta_1/\Delta_2$                               | .96/.98           |       | .97/.98           |       | .97/.98           |       |
| $\rho_1/\rho_2$                                   | .94/.96           |       | .95/.97           |       | .95/.96           |       |

\*  $p < 0.05$  ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

Notes: For the income-based analyses we subdivided respondents according to whether they were at or above the median in reported income (high-income respondents), versus those who were below the median reported income (low-income respondents). The coefficients reported in the table were estimated for the specifications given by equations 1-3 in the paper. See the paper for the descriptions and codings of the variables. Sources: 1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 British Election Study panels. Entries are unstandardized, maximum-likelihood estimates (the standard errors for these estimates are reported in parentheses). Factor variances, error variances, error covariances, and disturbances omitted for clarity.

**Table S3: Subconstituency Analyses - Newspaper Readership**

|   | 1987-1992         |       | 1992-1997         |       | 1997-2001        |       |
|---|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------|-------|
|   | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient(S.E) |       |
| <b><u>Newspaper Readers</u></b>                   |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .77**             | (.04) | .85**             | (.04) | .87**            | (.03) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .79**             | (.06) | .56**             | (.04) | .58**            | (.04) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | 1.04**            | (.14) | .91**             | (.13) | .57**            | (.07) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.68**            | (.11) | -.60**            | (.11) | -.05             | (.07) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | .01               | (.03) | -.04              | (.03) | -.06*            | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .46**             | (.16) | .59**             | (.12) | .10              | (.06) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | -.01              | (.04) | -.04              | (.04) | .06              | (.04) |
| <i>N</i>  | 1190              |       | 1336              |       | 1504             |       |
| <b><u>Not Newspaper Readers</u></b>               |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .68**             | (.09) | .83**             | (.07) | .82**            | (.05) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .62**             | (.09) | .53**             | (.06) | .88**            | (.05) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | .98**             | (.25) | .99**             | (.24) | .86**            | (.13) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.85**            | (.27) | -.54**            | (.16) | -.14             | (.13) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | .02               | (.07) | -.05              | (.05) | -.13*            | (.04) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .70**             | (.24) | .61**             | (.18) | .17              | (.11) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | .08               | (.06) | -.17*             | (.08) | -.12*            | (.05) |
| <i>N</i>  | 417               |       | 587               |       | 939              |       |
| <b>Model Fit</b>                                  |                   |       |                   |       |                  |       |
| $\chi^2$ (df = 172)                               | 716.6             |       | 449.3             |       | 526.6            |       |
| $\Delta_1/\Delta_2$                               | .97/.98           |       | .97/.98           |       | .97/.98          |       |
| $\rho_1/\rho_2$                                   | .95/.96           |       | .95/.97           |       | .95/.97          |       |

\*  $p < 0.05$  ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

**Notes:** For these analyses we subdivided respondents according to whether or not they reported reading a daily newspaper. The coefficients reported in the table were estimated for the specifications given by equations 1-3 in the paper. See the paper for the descriptions and codings of the variables. Sources: 1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 British Election Study panels. Entries are unstandardized, maximum-likelihood estimates (the standard errors for these estimates are reported in parentheses). Factor variances, error variances, error covariances, and disturbances omitted for clarity.

**Table S4: Subconstituency Analyses - Political Knowledge**

|   | <b>1992-97</b>    |       | <b>1997-01</b>   |       |
|---|-------------------|-------|------------------|-------|
|   | Coefficient (S.E) |       | Coefficient(S.E) |       |
| <b><u>High Knowledge</u></b>                      |                   |       |                  |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                  |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .68**             | (.05) | .89**            | (.04) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .57**             | (.05) | .89**            | (.04) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | .70**             | (.09) | .68**            | (.07) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                  |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.44**            | (.09) | .02              | (.08) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | -.02              | (.03) | -.08*            | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | .56**             | (.11) | .11              | (.07) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | -.05              | (.04) | .02              | (.04) |
| <i>N</i>  | 1151              |       | 1259             |       |
| <b><u>Low Knowledge</u></b>                       |                   |       |                  |       |
| <b>Stability Coefficients</b>                     |                   |       |                  |       |
| Labour Attachment → Labour Attachment             | .83**             | (.06) | .82**            | (.04) |
| Conservative Attachment → Conservative Attachment | .51**             | (.05) | .85**            | (.04) |
| Left-right preferences → Left-right preferences   | .71**             | (.17) | .51**            | (.09) |
| <b>Structural Coefficients</b>                    |                   |       |                  |       |
| Left-right preferences → Labour Attachment        | -.59**            | (.16) | -.08             | (.10) |
| Labour Attachment → Left-right preferences        | -.08              | (.04) | -.09**           | (.03) |
| Left-right preferences → Conservative Attachment  | -.49**            | (.15) | .10              | (.07) |
| Conservative Attachment → Left-right preferences  | -.08              | (.07) | -.00             | (.05) |
| <i>N</i>  | 770               |       | 1174             |       |
| <b>Model Fit</b>                                  |                   |       |                  |       |
| $\chi^2$ (df = 172)                               | 426.7             |       | 570.2            |       |
| $\Delta_1/\Delta_2$                               | .97/.98           |       | .97/.98          |       |
| $\rho_1/\rho_2$                                   | .95/.97           |       | .95/.96          |       |

\*  $p < 0.05$  ; \*\*  $p < .01$ .

**Notes:** For political knowledge we subdivided respondents according to whether they scored at or above the median on a political knowledge quiz (high-knowledge respondents), versus those who scored below the median on this quiz (low-knowledge respondents). The coefficients reported in the table were estimated for the specifications given by equations 1-3 in the paper. See the paper for the descriptions and codings of the variables. Sources: 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 British Election Study (BES) panels. (Note that the 1987-1992 BES panel did not include the political knowledge quiz, so that we cannot estimate coefficients on this panel.) Entries are unstandardized, maximum-likelihood estimates (the standard errors for these estimates are reported in parentheses). Factor variances, error variances, error covariances, and disturbances omitted for clarity.

## British Election Study Question Wording

Favor-oppose party: “Please choose a phrase from this card to say how you feel about the Labour/Conservative Party? 1 = strongly against, 2 = against, 3 = neither in favour nor against, 4 = favour, 5 = strongly favour.”

Party identification: ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as... [Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat...] or what?’

Strength of Party Identification: “Would you call yourself very strong [Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat...], fairly strong, or not very strong?”

Equalization of Incomes (Redistribution): Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about redistributing income.

*1 = ‘Make much greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal’*

*11 = ‘Be much less concerned about how equal people’s incomes are’*

Inflation/Unemployment: Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's top priority. Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government's top priority. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about unemployment and inflation.

*1 = ‘Getting people back to work should be the government’s top priority’*

*11 = ‘Keeping prices down should be the government’s top priority’*

Nationalization/Privatization: Some people feel that government should nationalise many more private companies. Other people feel that government should sell off many more nationalised industries. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about nationalisation and privatisation.

*1 = ‘Nationalize many more private companies’*

*11 = ‘Sell off many more nationalized industries’*

Tax/Spend (Social Services): Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. Other people feel that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Please tick whichever box comes closest to your own views about taxes and government spending.

*1 = ‘Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services’*

*11 = ‘Government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services’*